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Introduction
Of all the barometers capable of revealing to the
historian the deeper movements of an economy, monetary
phenomena are without doubt the most sensitive. But to
look upon them as a symptom only is to do them less
than justice: they have been, and they are, in their
turn, effective causes. One might think of them as a
seismograph that not only registers earth tremors,
but sometimes brings them about.1
On the formation of Union in 1910, South Africa inherited an
economy still under very powerful British domination. The banking
system was under the control of the so-called imperial banks: for
the most part British-owned with their head-offices and major
stock-holders based in London. Virtually all the country's
banking business was concentrated in the hands of the two largest
- the Standard Bank and Barclays Bank - and it was the common
practice for these banks to hold the greater part of their assets
as overseas investments.2
While formally, along with the rest of the British Empire,
on the gold standard, in practice the Union's currency formed
part of - more accurately, was an appendage of - Britain's
'formal finance empire',3 This was the institutional matrix of
exchange, trading and banking relations - known as the sterling-
area system - which had begun to characterise the imperial
economic system from about the first half of the nineteenth
century. The way this system worked was that 'most countries in
the Commonwealth, and many outside, [kept] their currencies
stable in terms of sterling and [held] some or all of their
1
 M. Bloch, 'The Problem of Gold in the Middle Ages' in M.
Bloch, Land and Work in Medieval Europe, (London, 1967), p. 186.
2
 On the advent of imperial banking in South Africa see,
V.E. Solomon, 'Money and Banking' in F.L. Coleman (ed), Economic
History of South Africa, (Pretoria, 1983), pp. 139-40.
3
 I have adapted this term from P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins,
'Gentlemanly Capitalism and British Imperialism', Faculty of
Commerce and Social Science Discussion Papers, University of
Birmingham, Series D, No. 10, (September 1986), p. 21.
international reserves in the convenient form of claims in
London'.4 This subordination of the Union's currency to sterling
was clearly demonstrated at the outbreak of the First World War,
when South Africa followed Britain off the gold standard and
directly tied its currency to sterling.5
Moreover, at the time of the making of Union the country's
economy revolved around a gold mining industry effectively in the
hands of imperial capital.6 The leading mining houses were all
British-based, raised most of their capital in the London stock-
market, had their head-quarters and held their annual general
meetings in London.7
The degree of dependency on the mining industry is quickly
appreciated when it is realised that of the proceeds earned by
the gold producers on the London gold market, more than two-
thirds were required in South Africa for currency and wage
purposes.8 This made the mining industry a main source of
revenue for the government, the principal contributor to the
funds of the banks, and the biggest foreign exchange earner.9
Imperial capital's dominance over the mining industry was
further reinforced by the fact that South Africa did not have a
refinery and mint of its own. Consequently, the gold producers
4
 L.S. Pressnell, '1925: The Burden of Sterling", Economic
History Review, Second Series, 31 (February, 1978), p. 67.
5
 G. De Kock, A History of the South African Reserve Bank,
1920-52, (Pretoria, 1951), p. 9.
6
 Defining what is meant by imperial capital is a highly
contentious matter. In this paper the term is used to distinguish
capital which had its origins outside of the country from capital
which had its origins inside the country itself. The former
consisted mainly of capital involved in mining and banking, and
the latter of capital involved in agriculture and small-scale
manufacturing. Of course the divisions were never this clear-cut
and absolute, and with the passage of time became more blurred.
But in the early years of Union a case can be made for
differentiating between these two forms of capital. For a
discussion of this issue see B. Bozzoli, The Political Nature of
a Ruling Class, Capital and Ideology in South Africa 1890-1933,
(London, 1981), pp. 170-2.
7
 J.J. Van-Helten, 'Empire and High-Finance: South Africa
and the International Gold Standard 1890-1914', Journal of
African History, 23, (1982), p. 539.
8
 Bank of England Archives (hereafter BEA), C43/137, The
London Gold Market, undated.
9
 Government receipts from mining averaged 7 per cent of its
annual direct revenue between 1911 and 1930. R.V. Kubicek,
'Mining: Patterns of Dependence and Development 1870-1930' in
Z.A. Konczacki, J.L. Parpart and T.M. Shaw (eds) , Studies in the
Economic History of Southern Africa, Volume Two, (London, 1991),
p. 81.
were obliged to export all their bullion in its raw form to
London, where it was dealt with by refiners such as N.M.
Rothschilds and Sons, and then offered for sale on the London
Gold Market. Any gold which remained unsold was bought by the
Bank of England at the fixed statutory price of 77s 9d per
standard ounce.10
Thus, almost at every level, South Africa's economy in the
immediate post-Union years was structured in such a way that it
serviced the needs and interests of imperial capital. Indeed, in
many ways the country could be said to have been the 1910's
equivalent of a 'banana republic'.
However, by the middle 1920s, a significant - if not
dramatic change - had occurred. In 1921 South Africa established
its own central reserve bank, which took over many of the
functions of the Bank of England, and began to challenge the
imperial banks domination of the money market. In the same year
the country acquired its own refinery, and two years later
erected its own mint, thus lessening its dependence on the London
Gold Market.
Furthermore, at the beginning of 1925 South Africa took the
decision to restore its currency on an independent gold basis,
despite strong opposition from the British side that it should
retain the link with sterling and time its return to the gold
standard to coincide with that of Britain's.11
The country's dependence on a mining industry monopolised
by British capital also came under challenge - both from within
the mining sector itself as well as from other sectors of the
economy. In 1917, the Anglo American Corporation of South Africa
was founded, which self-consciously styled itself a 'South
African company', registering in the country and inviting
prominent South Africans to serve on its board of directors.12
In turn, the manufacturing sector began to play an increasingly
prominent role in the economy, later overtaking mining as the
main contributor to the gross national product.13
Thus it is evident that between 1914 and 1925, South
Africa's economy underwent an important and far-reaching
transformation. From being a relatively narrow-based economy,
dominated by the mining industry and subordinate to the interests
10
 The usual procedure was that the various mining companies
in South Africa would deliver their output to the main local
banks, the Standard Bank and the National Bank, which then
arranged weekly shipments of the unrefined metal to London.
Rothschilds Archive London (hereafter RAL), T65/59, Memorandum
on the Gold Market, 1937.
11
 The background to and significance of this decision is
explained below.
12
 D. Innes, Anglo American and the Rise of Modern South
Africa, (Johannesburg, 1984), pp. 91-2.
13
 D. Hobart Houghton, The South African Economy, (London,
1969), p. 121. Mining, however, remained (and still remains) the
principal foreign exchange earner.
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of imperial capital, it became a more broadly-based and
diversified economy, with national capital beginning to challenge
the hegemony of imperial capital.14 The reasons for this
transformation have been variously explained: the rise of
Afrikaner nationalism in the form of Hertzogism;15 a change in
the power-bloc leading to the triumph of national capital over
imperial capital;16 the growth of local manufacturing, which was
accompanied by a more pronounced 'South Africanist' ideology.17
It is not the intention in this paper to deal with any of these
arguments, which to a greater and lesser degree illuminate many
of the processes which were at work. Rather, it is to turn the
focus to an issue which is usually left out of the discussion:
the role that monetary questions played in influencing the
14
 Bozzoli usefully describes this process of transition,
even if she does go beyond the period under discussion in this
paper: 'The First World War finds us with an imperial system,
dominated by mining capital, and dependent upon and defended by
merchant capital, that had, in spite of itself, spawned a
challenging national bourgeoisie, the realisation of whose
interests implied the destruction of many facets of imperial
hegemony. By the Second World War, by contrast, it seems that
most would agree that many of the interests of the national
bourgeoisie had indeed come to be realised, and that by
implication, therefore, imperial hegemony had been ended, or at
least severely undermined'. Bozzoli, Political Nature, p. 142.
15
 This is the favoured explanation among those who write
within the so-called 'liberal framework'. Thus, Hobart Houghton,
for example, writes about Hertzog's victory in 1924 as follows,
' The Pact government embarked upon a policy of encouraging
manufacturing industries in order to provide a new field of
employment for whites displaced from rural areas . . .' . Hobart
Houghton, South African Economy, p. 145.
16
 This version of the change is very popular in works
influenced by Althusser and Poulantzas. See especially R. Davies,
D. Kaplan, M. Morris and D. O'Meara, 'Class Struggle and the
Periodisation of the State in South Africa', Review of Political
Economy, No.7 (September - December 1976), pp. 4-30.
17
 Bozzoli tends in this direction. As she writes at one
point in her study of the emergence of a national bourgeoisie in
South Africa, 'National capital, by the end of the period under
discussion [1930s], was also a class of great complexity, made
up of industrialists, traders, certain mining companies, and
farmers. But it was led by one of its sections - manufacturing.
Just as mining capital had led and forged imperial hegemony, so
did manufacturing capital seek to lead the process whereby the
national bourgeoisie could replace the imperial one.' Bozzoli,
Political Nature, p. 171.
direction and pace of the changes.18
Needless to say, monetary questions on their own cannot
account for the profound changes that took place in South Africa
between 1914 and 1925. However, when placed in the context of
the political and socio-economic struggles taking place at the
time, a study of these questions - often hidden from the surface
- can, as Marc Bloch suggests, reveal a great deal to the
historian about how - and sometimes even why - economies and
societies evolve and change.
Early challenge to British domination
South Africa's position with regard to banking and currency on
the formation of Union was perhaps the sharpest expression of the
extent of its domination by imperial capital. The country's main
commercial banks, as has been seen, were British-owned and
firmly locked into the financial institutions of the City of
London. As has also been pointed out, the tendency was for these
banks to keep most of their assets as overseas investments.
Consequently, decisions affecting monetary policy in the Union
were quite often as much determined by the interests of imperial
capital, as they were by considerations of what was in South
Africa's interests. And even when the Union authorities did
attempt to counter this strong imperial influence, their efforts
were frustrated by the fact that the country did not have a
uniform currency and banking system; each of the four provinces
operating on the basis of their own currency and banking laws.19
With the outbreak of hostilities in 1914, South Africa
effectively ceased to have an independent currency. To be sure,
the Union government at the time had little choice but to link
the South African pound to sterling. The impossibility of
continuing the weekly shipments of gold to London because of the
dangerous war conditions and the prohibitive insurance costs had
presented the Union with a real threat of a collapse of its
monetary system; especially given that the whole machinery of
exchange rested quite heavily on the earnings from the export and
sale of this gold in the London market. This notwithstanding, the
fact still remained that once the war began, South Africa's
currency became indistinguishable from sterling.
It should come as no great surprise then that an early
skirmish between South Africa and Britain should have been over
an issue relating to the currency question. This occurred shortly
18
 A notable exception is S. Gelb, 'The Origins of the South
African Reserve Bank, 1914-1920', in A. Mabin (ed), Organisation
and Economic Change, Southern African Studies, Volume 5,
(Johannesburg, 1989). However, largely missing from Gelb's work
is a discussion of the relationship between politics and
economics.
19
 For an account of these different currency and banking
laws see E.H.D. Arndt, Banking and Currency Development in South
Africa, 1652-1927, (Cape Town, 1928), pp. 420-1.
after the outbreak of the war when the matter of erecting a
branch of the Royal Mint in South Africa arose.
The late South African Republic had established a mint in
18 93 under a concession granted to the National Bank of the
Republic by Kruger's government. This concession had subsequently
been cancelled by the Transvaal Crown Colony Government, but the
question of restarting the Pretoria Mint had remained a sensitive
political issue; no doubt enhanced by the fact that it was
Milner's administration which had shut it down.
But now with war having broken out, the Botha-Smuts
government felt that South Africa should have its own mint in
order to be able to deal with any contingencies that might arise;
such as, for example, a shortage of specie because of the
disruption of normal shipping. The Union's High Commissioner was
accordingly requested to approach the British government to send
a mint expert to South Africa to look into the viability of
erecting a local mint.20
However, it was also apparent that the Union government was
looking ahead to the role that it hoped the country would play
in the region after the war, and that it saw the establishment
of a mint in South Africa as integrating the country into the
imperial economic system in a more effective way. After all, the
Union had already occupied German South West Africa as requested
by Britain - once again proving its loyalty to the imperial cause
- and therefore thought it only natural that South Africa would
be rewarded with greater responsibilities in the post-war
Southern Africa. Nightingale from the Treasury explained the
thinking behind this to the Colonial Office,
It is assumed that the currency requirements of the
country [South Africa] will expand considerably after
the war. It is thought that, with the facilities
available for obtaining bullion locally, a Mint
established in the Union would be in a favourable
position to supply the requirements of other
Governments in Central and Southern Africa (where
British interests are generally expanding) and also to
mint gold for export overseas.21
Unfortunately for the Union government, its proposal to establish
a local mint conflicted quite sharply with Britain's assessment
of where its priorities lay. For, if the case could be made for
the Union to have its own mint, then an even stronger one could
be made for it to have its own refinery. Why send all the raw
gold to London for refining, which greatly added to the costs of
the gold producers,22 only to have it brought back to the
20
 BEA, C40/359, T.S. Nightingale, Treasury, to the Under-
secretary of the State, Colonial Office, 8 September 1916.
21
 ibid.
22
 Van-Helten has calculated that refining charges could
often be as high as 10 per cent ad valorem. Together with the
freight and insurance charges this worked out to between 14 and
country again for minting? As Bradbury of the Treasury pointed
out to the Colonial Office,
'It [is] clear that as a necessary preliminary to the
coinage of gold a refinery must be provided for the
rough gold as it comes from the mines' .23
But, as has been seen, one of the reasons for South Africa being
so dependent on the London gold market was because it did not
possess any refining and minting facilities of its own. Thus,
fearful that South Africa's self-sufficiency could threaten the
position of the London gold market - made quite vulnerable by the
outbreak of the war - the Bank of England strongly urged the
Treasury to resist any departure from the existing method of
minting sovereigns. It was 'the steady weekly flow of Raw Gold
from South Africa to London for many years', the Bank's Chief
Cashier explained to the Treasury, which had 'done much to
maintain London in the proud position of the only free Gold
Market of the world'. He went on,
. . . and it would seem that no suggestion should now be
encouraged which would deprive London in even a
moderate degree of this important source of Gold
supply, a source upon which in future she may desire
to rely in even greater degree than in the past.24
Pleading that the war had led to a depletion in its staff, and
that it was therefore impossible to release any of the Mint's
senior officers to visit the Union, the British government
succeeded in convincing its South African counterpart to shelve
the matter.2S But this could never be more than a holding
devise. Indeed, for the Nationalists, a country's power to coin
specie, that is, issue its own currency, was seen as the
touchstone of its sovereignty. Thus the demand for a local mint
was to feature prominently in their political campaign against
what they saw as South Africa's economic subordination to
'imperialist' Britain.
Breaking with sterling?
If during the war years Britain had been able to keep South
15 per cent ad valorem, which whittled down the original value
of an ounce of gold from 77s 9d to 70s. Van-Helten, 'Empire and
High Finance', p. 538.
23
 BEA, C40/359, Bradbury to Colonial Office, 19 December
1916.
24
 BEA, C40/3.59, Chief Cashier of Bank of England to
Secretary of the Treasury, 27 December 1916.
25
 BEA, C40/359, Bradbury, Treasury to Under-Secretary of
State, Colonial Office, 19 December 1916.
Africa firmly within the imperial economic system, it was to
discover that the changed conditions after the war seriously
undermined its ability to control events in the Union. Like most
of the other countries which had been involved in the fighting.
South Africa also emerged from the war facing a serious economic
crisis. That this came after a short-lived boom between 1919 and
1920, gave the slump a particularly severe character. Amongst
some of the more urgent socio-economic problems Smuts's
government found itself having to contend with were: the 'poor
white problem'; the rehabilitation of agriculture;, the
development of secondary industry; and the future of the mining
industry, especially the marginal mines.26 These conditions were
to provide fertile soil for a national sentiment to begin to take
root in economic policy,27 which Hertzog and his followers would
not be slow to exploit.
Britain's position was not helped by the profitability
crisis the Union's gold mining industry experienced in the
aftermath of the war. Owing to increases in the costs of
supplies, scarcity of labour, and a decline in the grade of the
ore mined, many mines found themselves in danger of having to
close down.28 Particularly irksome to the Nationalists was that
these threatened closures came despite the fact that the
purchasing power of gold had been advancing all the time on the
open market. Standing in the way of the South African gold
producers realising these higher prices, however, was a special
wartime selling agreement the Bank of England had concluded with
the gold producers - still very much in force - which forced them
to sell their gold to the Bank at the official price.29 This
meant that while other industries were able pass on their cost
increases to the buyers of their product, the mining industry was
having to a£sorb all its extra costs on its own because the price
at which it could sell its product was being kept fixed.
26
 D. Hobart Houghton and J. Dagut (ed), Source Material on
the South Africa Economy: Vol.3, 1920-1970, (Cape Town, 1973),
p. 89.
27
 It was in fact during these years that the so-called
'peoples banks' were established; which consciously aimed at
improving the lot of the 'small man'. The first of these 'peoples
banks' - Ons Eerste Volksbank - was founded in January 1917, and
stated in its constitution that its object was 'to promote the
social and moral welfare of the population of South Africa in
general and of the inhabitants of Pretoria and suburbs in
particular'. E.H.D. Arndt, 'Peoples Banks in South Africa',
University of Pretoria, Series No.Ill: Arts and Social Sciences
No.10, (May 1940), p. 4, emphasis added.
28
 BEA, C40/359, Buxton, Governor-General of South Africa to
Secretary of State of Colonies, 22 May 1918.
29
 For a fuller discussion of the significance of this
arrangement see R. Ally, 'War and Gold: the Bank of England, the
London gold market and South Africa's gold, 1914-19', Journal
African Studies, Vol.17, No.2, (June 1991), pp. 221-238.
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But it was not the gold question per se which triggered off
the challenge to imperial domination. It was the issue of the
monetary relations between the two countries. This happened as
follows. Shortly after the outbreak of the war, Britain had
pegged sterling to the dollar at the pre-war parity. The
significance of this decision was that it kept sterling a gold-
based currency even though Britain had formally abandoned the
gold standard. For while there was an embargo on the export of
bullion from the United Kingdom, and the immediate
interconvertibility between sterling and gold was ended, gold
exports were still permitted in the United States.30
But as the war drew to a close, Britain found it
increasingly difficult to maintain sterling at its pre-war rate -
involving as it did massive subsidisation -31 and in March 1919
was finally forced to unpeg the sterling-dollar exchange. Until
this action the link between the South African pound and sterling
had been maintained without any serious tensions. De Kock
explains why this was possible:
The fact that during the whole of this period [the war
years] the Union remained nominally on the gold
standard, in so far as gold coin continued to
circulate and the banks remained legally obliged to
redeem their notes at par, caused no trouble as long
as sterling was maintained close to mint parity with
the gold dollar.32
The removal of the peg changed all this. Sterling declined
sharply in value vis-a-vis the dollar,33 and, as the South
African pound was linked to sterling, it naturally suffered a
similar fate. For a country so heavily dependent on imports as
South Africa - and especially British imports34 - the
depreciation of the currency inevitably led to the unleashing of
30
 For the background to this decision and its significance
see ibid., pp. 225-6.
31
 Moggridge points out that the pegging of the exchange
involved the use of substantial resources, official support
totalling $2 021 between the financial years 1915-16 and 1918-
1919, with quite considerable private support as well. D.E.
Moggridge, British Monetary Policy, 1924-1931, The Norman
Conquest of $4.86, (Cambridge, 1972), p. 17.
32
 De Kock, History of, pp. 10-11, emphasis added.
33
 The peg had been set at $4.76. By December 1919 sterling
had dropped $3.85, and in February 1920 to as low as $3.33. BEA,
C40/137, The London Gold Market, August 1937.
34
 At the time British goods accounted for over 50 per cent
of South Africa's imports.
inflationary pressures.35
An outward sign that the Union' s currency was in trouble was
a marked disappearance of gold coin from the country. This was
despite the fact that South Africa, following Britain's lead, had
also imposed an embargo on the export of all bullion.36 Yet,
figures prepared by the Union's Treasury showed that from 1 April
1918 to 31 March 1920 specie to the value of £2 945 435 had left
the country. Moreover, that the heaviest leakage had coincided
with the lifting of the sterling-dollar peg in March 1919.37
The reason the country was losing its gold coin in such
large amounts was because the depreciation in sterling's value
meant that the gold content of the sovereign was now worth much
more than its equivalent in paper money. In other words, while
a sovereign was still only worth 20s in the Union, in the Indian
Bazaars it could fetch as much as 38s 9d.38 This made smuggling
a very lucrative business, with people obviously quite willing
to take big risks to circumvent the embargo.
Most put out by this drainage of gold coin from the country
were the banks. For the embargo on the export of bullion did not
exempt them from the legal obligation of having to exchange their
notes for sovereigns at par. Thus the anomalous situation arose
where the banks were paying more for gold coin than they were
receiving for selling it. For in order to meet the increased
demand for specie, as well as replace their own diminishing
stock, the banks had to import gold coin from London at the
premium price. Often this could as high as 28s, which they could
not sell in the Union for more than 20s.39
Naturally the bankers found this situation intolerable and
appealed directly to Smuts's government to make their notes
inconvertible; that is, they wanted the complete suspension of
the gold standard in South Africa. It was largely in response to
this request from the bankers that Smuts's government agreed to
convene a special Gold Conference in October 1919,
in order that by a free exchange of views the best
ways of safeguarding the interests of South Africa and
of placing its currency on a natural basis might be
35
 That much of the inflation was imported was undeniably
true. For as De Kock points out, while the index of wholesale
prices of South African goods only rose from 1083 in 1914 to 2249
in 1920, the index of prices of imported goods rose from 1106 to
3185 over the same period. De Kock, History of, p. 9.
36
 Proclamation No. 243 of 1914 issued under the provisions
of the Public Welfare and Moratorium Act and its later
amendments.
37
 S.C.2-'2O, pp. v i - v i i .
38
 ibid., p. 20.
39
 E. Cannan, 'South African Currency ' , The Economic
Journal, Vol.XXX, (1920), p . 522.
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found.40
The Gold Conference was in many ways to be the harbinger of what
would later develop into an irresistible movement for South
Africa's greater economic independence from Great Britain.
Underlying its deliberations were essentially two questions:
first, should the embargo on the export of gold be lifted; and
second, should the Union break with sterling and re-establish its
currency on a gold basis? There was a connection between these
two questions in that a genuinely convertible currency was
incompatible with any restrictions on the export of specie.
Cannan explains,
When a paper currency is convertible into free gold,
it cannot go below its par with gold, because its
convertibility limits the quantity of it which can be
put into circulation: when it is convertible only into
coin which cannot be used otherwise than as currency
[that is, cannot be exported], it can be issued just
as freely as if it were wholly irredeemable, and with
the same effect on the general purchasing power of the
unit of account.41
Predictably, the bankers came to the Gold Conference hoping not
only that it would recommend the maintenance of the embargo, but
that it would also support their proposal to make their notes
inconvertible while sovereigns were still fetching such a high
premium.42 But as the Conference progressed, the bankers found
themselves increasingly on the defensive. The direct implication
of their proposal was that South Africa should retain the link
with sterling and time its return to gold to coincide more or
less with that of Britain's. However, the bankers had seriously
underestimated just how much of a sensitive political and
economic issue this was.
At the time that the Gold Conference convened, the country
was experiencing some of its worst inflation, which was wiping
out the savings of the middle classes and causing a general
decline in the standard of living.43 Given that South Africa
imported the bulk of her consumer goods from Britain, it was easy
to blame this inflation on high prices in the United Kingdom.
Preparing the ground for just such an attack, J.W. Jagger,
a Unionist M.P. - but who also happened to be a prominent
40
 U.G.18-'2O, p. 1. The Conference sat for two days, 22-23
October 1919. Those invited to attend included the general
mangers of the four main banks, representatives of the different
political parties, and spokesmen for mining, manufacturing and
agriculture.
41 Cannan, 'South African Currency', p. 521.
42
 See the statement submitted on their behalf by Reynolds,
the General Manager of the National Bank. U.G.18-'2O, p. 15.
43
 See De Kock, History of, p. 9.
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importer, and thus had a vested interest in a strong currency -
declared in his opening remarks to the Conference,
At the present time prices in South Africa were at the
mercy of the United Kingdom currency vagaries. We
suffered in South Africa largely as a result of
inflation in England.44
This in itself would have been bad enough, Jagger went on, except
that having abandoned the gold standard, Britain was not showing
any real inclination to want to limit or control its issue of
paper money. Instead, he contended, the British authorities were
using the ending of official exchange support for sterling to
recklessly enlarge the country's note issue:
To-day in the United Kingdom there was no control over
the issue of currency notes, they were issued by the
Treasury, the same authority that spent the money.
There was no relationship between any gold reserve and
notes issued.45
A similar accusation was made against the banks operating in
South Africa. A wide-spread feeling was that they had also
exploited the fact that they were not obliged to provide gold
coin for export during the war years to overissue paper currency
and expand their credit.46 But now that they were experiencing
hard times, they had cut back drastically on their credit
facilities. Thus, the bankers' proposal that the embargo be
retained received as unfavourable a response as their suggestion
that South Africa retain its currency ties with Britain.
Particularly aggrieved by the restrictions on the free
export of gold were the spokesmen for labour. As far as they were
concerned the embargo debased the value of sovereigns, thus
robbing ordinary working people of the true value of their
labour. F.H. Creswell the leader of the Labour Party, maintained
that
under the system in operation today any man in
recovering payment of so many pounds in paper or
sovereigns was defrauded of the real purchasing power
of those pounds. He was not allowed to send it to
America although he might get a good deal more goods
44
 U.G.18-'2O, p. 4.
45
 ibid., p. 2.
46
 Proof of this was that while the banks' liabilities had
risen dramatically since 1914, the amount of bullion in their
possession had remained unchanged. In fact, the ratio of notes
and deposits to gold had actually come down from 19.5 per cent
in 1914 to 6.7 per cent in 1919. S. Evans, 'The Gold Premium',
The Journal of Chemical, Metallurgical and Mining Society of
South Africa, Vol.XX, (May 1920), p. 211.
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than in Cape Town. 47
If the Gold Conference was opposed to the idea of retaining the
embargo, then it was positively hostile to the bankers' further
suggestion of introducing an inconvertible paper currency. Mr.
van der Horst, M.P. in a Nationalist stronghold in the Western
Transvaal, spoke of an 'upheaval' if the government were to
attempt this. 'Go among the other classes of people to whom they
had to rely on to support law and order', he advised, and the
authorities would discover soon enough the strength of feeling
against uncovered paper money. The priority for him was to bring
down the cost of living. This meant controlling inflation, which
was only possible on the basis of a return to gold. Thus he
warned, 'Neither this government nor any other government would
survive that tried to adopt an uncovered inconvertible paper
currency' .48
The proposal to break with sterling and restore South
Africa's currency on an independent gold basis had the political
appeal of freeing the country's monetary system from direct
imperial control. Jagger, for example, averred that for so long
as South Africa's currency was 'governed' by 'English currency
values' it did not matter what measures it took to stabilise its
monetary situation, as this could all be undone by decisions
taken in Whitehall.49 Creswell was even more blunt,
we were tacked on the monetary system of Great Britain
and all the disadvantages that accrue from the
inflated currency of Great Britain. We were simply
another Province of Great Britain suffering from an
over big issue of notes and suffering from the
inflation of currency. It was the A.B.C. of the matter
that had to be kept in sight.50
When at the end of the Gold Conference, Farrer, the Union's
Minister of Finance, called for resolutions to be submitted, two
clear positions emerged. On the one side were the National and
Labour politicians, who held that it was in South Africa's
interests to remove the embargo and return to gold at the
earliest possible date. And on the other, the bank managers, who
felt that it would be exceedingly dangerous for the Union to
attempt to do this while the international monetary situation was
still so unstable.51
But while those favouring a return to gold dominated the
47
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Conference, they were not able to get a clear majority.52 The
main reason for this was the reluctance of the mining industry
to back their proposals. The Chamber of Mines, still very much
under the influence of Central Mining and Investment
Corporation," clearly feared alienating the City of London,
which was the risk that breaking with sterling and returning to
the gold standard independently of Britain carried. More
immediately, the mineowners did not want to lose the premium that
had arisen on the sterling price paid for gold,54 likely to
happen if the South African currency was restored to mint parity.
One of their spokesmen, Mr. French, explained in their defence
that as ' several [mines] were just kept going to-day by the
premium which gold was fetching', these mines would obviously
have to be shut down if the premium disappeared.55
In the end it was left to Ernest Oppenheimer, Chairman of
the recently established Anglo American Corporation of South
Africa, to try and break the stalemate. Although Anglo at the
time was still a relatively junior-ranking mining company, it was
rapidly acquiring a prominent place both in the mining sector and
South Africa's economy as a whole.56 Particularly significant,
however, was its stronger domestic base than the older mining
companies and its closer ties with American capital, most notably
J.P. Morgan of the banking firm of New York.
While more sympathetic to Jagger's proposal than he was to
that of the bankers, Oppenheimer was enough of a realist to
recognise that South Africa was not yet in a position to embark
on a financial and monetary course of its own. The country did
not possess its own mint and refinery, which meant that it would
not be able to take full advantage of the premium on gold coin.
But even more importantly, the banks in South Africa in their
existing form were not capable of undertaking the exchange
business necessary to maintain the currency on a gold basis. As
he unflatteringly put it,
[the South African banks] were like Provincial Stock
Banks in England and their exchange merely amounted to
52
 In fact, their motion was defeated by just one vote,
ibid., p. 14.
53
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charging a commission and interest for the period of
the bills of exchange.57
Thus the main task was to create the conditions that would make
it possible for the country to take charge of its own financial
affairs. That Oppenheimer succeeded in achieving the necessary
consensus is evident from the fact that his motion won a majority
of eight votes to five. In terms of this motion, it was resolved:
(a) That the establishment of natural exchanges and of
a free market for gold in the Union is desirable.
(b) That to this end the establishment of a Mint and
a Refinery should proceed with the utmost despatch.
(c) That the Gold producers be requested to take steps
to secure a modification of their selling agreement
with the Bank of England so as to permit termination
at short notice.
(d) That the embargo on the export of specie from the
Union not be continued after the establishment of the
mint.58
On the surface this might have seemed like a compromise solution.
The Gold Conference neither proposed the immediate lifting of the
embargo, nor did it recommend the restoration of the gold
standard forthwith. Taken as a whole, however, the motion
represented a clear challenge to what was perceived to be South
Africa's economic subordination to imperial Britain. The case for
restoring South Africa's currency on a gold basis, even if this
meant independently of Britain, had been forcibly put, and had
been accepted in principle. Indeed, to facilitate as well as
safeguard these first tentative steps towards greater monetary
independence from Britain, the Conference passed a further
resolution stating that it had
been impressed with the necessity for one uniform Bank
Act for the whole Union and would impress upon the
Government the urgency of the introduction of such a
measure in the next Session of Parliament, which
should provide inter alia stringent provisions against
the inflation of currency.59
What was also indisputable was that the bankers' scheme for an
inconvertible paper currency had been roundly defeated.
A reversal in orientation
The Gold Conference's firm rejection of an inconvertible paper
currency reflected the political unpopularity of any further
weakening of the currency's gold basis. It was already felt that
57
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the embargo on its own had caused enough damage to the country's
monetary system, with much of the opprobrium, as has been seen,
being reserved for the banks. Thus, any suggestion that the banks
could now be trusted with an inconvertible currency inevitably
aroused strong antagonistic feelings. So much so that Smuts
initially felt obliged to along with Gold Conference's
resolutions. Speaking at his own party's conference in Pretoria
a few weeks after the Gold Conference, he proclaimed,
South Africa was the only country in the world where
one could go into a bank a get gold in exchange for
notes and cheques. The [Gold] Conference advised the
Government to continue this gold currency and not to
resort to notes. A gold currency was an immense source
of strength, and upon that basis they must build up
their industries. The Government agreed with these
principles, and would proceed upon such lines.60
All the more surprising then that hardly three months later,
Smuts's government made what amounted to a complete volte face.
It not only agreed to retain the embargo, but also accepted in
principle the need to withdraw all the gold coin in circulation
and replace this with an inconvertible currency. What is even
more remarkable is that this turnabout was in the face of what
appeared to be growing support for the Nationalists on the
currency question.
For sensing Smuts's vulnerability on this question, the
Nationalists had embarked on an orchestrated political campaign
against any type of inconvertible currency. Portraying his
government as being in cohorts with the banks to swindle the
'small people', they used every opportunity to discredit the
existing monetary arrangements. At times this came close to
incitement against the banks. As the General Manager of the
National Bank of South Africa reported very worriedly to the
Secretary for Finance early in December 1919,
At a largely attended Nationalist Meeting yesterday,
the speakers included Mr. Tielman Roos and Revd. v.d.
Horst M.L.A.; the latter warned his hearers against
Bank Notes or 'Bluebacks' as he termed them. He
assured his audience that if they presented our notes
to this or that branch of the Bank, they would be
unable to obtain gold for same and also that the Banks
generally could not redeem their notes in gold if they
required.61
This meeting took place in Zwartruggens, Western Transvaal, which
60 Quoted in Evans, 'The Gold Premium', p. 136.
61
 Transvaal Archive Department, Pretoria (hereafter TAD),
TES/9/460/3, General Manager, National Bank of South Africa to
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had formed part of the heartland of the 1914 Afrikaner
rebellion.62 But that the Nationalists were also finding a
receptive audience for their views in other parts of the country
is evident from this account of the Assistant General Manager of
the National Bank:
as one direct result of certain speeches
recently delivered at Smithfield, O.F.S., by a
prominent politician, a very esteemed client of our
Springfontein, O.F.S. Branch - Senator E.R. Grobler -
called on our local Manager on the 15th instant
[December] with the intention of withdrawing his bank
balance in gold. The cause assigned was the alarm he
felt at the statements made by General Hertzog at his
recent Smithfield meetings.63
In fact, Nationalist agitation against the banks became of such
an alarmist nature that the Minister of Justice was called upon
to intervene. Drawing the Minister's attention to a charge made
by van der Horst in a public meeting in Maquassi, South-Western
Transvaal, that the bank notes in circulation were no longer
covered by either gold or silver, Reg. C. Read, a solicitor in
the area, remarked,
The result of this statement is gripping people's
imaginations, and some silly person has now spread the
rumour that the paper note is only worth 15/-. If this
pernicious fallacy gets further I am afraid it might
have serious results, which might spread through the
Union. I know of many cases of persons demanding gold
on van der Horst' s statements . ,6A
But if immediately following the Gold Conference Smuts seemed to
be going out of his way to appease the Nationalists, then by
early 1920 it is evident that he had decided to take them head-
on. Part of the reason for this change in his stance was
undoubtedly a desire to put an end to the uncertainty which
characterised the monetary situation. For even if an
inconvertible paper currency was unpopular, it at least had the
advantage of scotching the charge that his government had no
policy when it came to currency matters. However, the question
still remains, why did Smuts chose that particular monetary
policy - especially given the political dangers he knew he was
courting - and not another?
The key to the dramatic shift in policy is to be sought in
62 S.B. Spies, 'The Rebellion in South Africa, 1914-15',
unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Witwatersrand, (1963), map
on first page.
63
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the role played by Henry Strakosch,65 who was invited to South
Africa by Smuts for further consultation on the country's
exchange and currency problem after the Gold Conference had
ended.66 But having said this, it is important that Strakosch's
role not be understood in the way that E.H.D. Arndt and others
have presented it. According to Arndt,
Strakosch came, saw and conquered, all in five short
months. He arrived in January and left on June 4, 1920
and in the meantime he had conquered the Government,
the Select Committee and apparently Parliament.67
Not only is this misleading, in that Strakosch's triumph was not
as absolute as Arndt implies, but it has the further weakness of
reducing the reversal in policy to the actions of one individual.
Certainly, Strakosch's arrival in South Africa was to prove
decisive; especially in convincing Smuts against following the
advise of the Gold Conference. But in order to properly
understand how Strakosch was able to accomplish this, it is
necessary that he be seen in relation the balance of forces
existing at the time.
Strakosch represented powerful interests. He was the
65
 Strakosch was of Central European origin. He began his
career in London as a foreign exchange dealer. Later he became
Managing Director of the Union Corporation, a holding company
with extensive foreign investments, most notably in South Africa,
where it controlled several mines. He was made Britain's
representative on the League of Nation's Financial Committee and
also served as an economic advisor to Smuts's government. This
placed him in the position of unique intermediary between the
Bank of England and the South African authorities.
66
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Managing Director of a leading mining house, Union Corporation,
and had a long and intimate association with the City of London.
He was also close to Montague Norman, the Governor of the Bank
of England, and enjoyed the confidence of many in the Treasury
and others - like the Rothschilds - who were influential in
British monetary circles. These interests clearly did not wish
to see South Africa restore its free market in gold and return
to the gold standard while Britain was not yet in a position to
do likewise. There were two main reasons for this.
In the first place, the Bank of England had as recently as
July 1919 signed a new selling agreement with South Africa's gold
producers which explicitly restricted the sale of South Africa's
gold through the London gold market. This need to control the
disposal of South Africa's gold was seen as vital given that New
York was beginning to challenge London's position as the world's
main gold market. Thus, the British authorities were extremely
apprehensive about South Africa being free to dispose of its gold
as it chose.68
Of even greater concern was the potential long term
consequences of South Africa re-establishing its currency on a
gold basis while sterling still remained below parity. The fear
was that with South Africa on the gold standard, the natural
tendency would be for it to be pulled closer to the United
States, which at the time was the only other country with a gold
currency. As a contemporary South African economist observed at
the time:
there are indications that American financiers are
taking an interest in the development of [our] mineral
resources .... Unless however our currency is soon
restored to the gold standard basis, we cannot expect
that much capital will come from the U.S.69
Strakosch's central concern on accepting the invitation,
therefore, was to keep the country within the imperial economic
system; which meant preserving the close financial and currency
links with Great Britain, and not, as was being advocated by the
Gold Conference, unilaterally breaking these links. He arrived
in South Africa well prepared for his task -having been asked
earlier by Smuts to prepare a pamphlet on South Africa's currency
and monetary situation.70
The main thrust of his intervention was to highlight the
68
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disaster that South Africa was inviting upon itself by believing
that it could restore its currency on a gold basis independently
of Britain. This emphasis was not accidental. The Gold Conference
had presented the return to gold as a panacea for all the
country's economic woes. Thus, if Strakosch hoped to reverse this
orientation, he had to prove the opposite.
He did not dispute that a currency based on the gold
standard was the 'soundest and best policy' .71 What he
challenged, however, was the notion that this policy could be
implemented without regard to the world conditions at any
particular time, or to the specific way in which a country had
been incorporated into the system of international finance.72
Rejecting the charge that South Africa's monetary problems
had their origins in the link with sterling, Strakosch maintained
that inflation and high prices were a world-wide phenomenon, and
not something peculiar to any one country. And the reason for
this, he insisted, was not simply because the world's currencies
were no longer on a gold basis, but because the war had destroyed
the pre-1914 patterns of international trade.
Turning to South Africa's specific situation, he contended
out that as the country had a net balance-of-payments deficit,
this put into serious question
whether, in the existing extraordinary conditions, and
having regard to South Africa's economic position and
activities in relation to the rest of the world, it
can afford to re-establish and maintain its currency
on a true gold basis.73
Worse still, as gold coin was fetching as much as 38s 9d in the
Indian Bazaars, sovereigns would only be able to circulate safely
in the Union if its currency was maintained at parity with these
abnormally high prices. Otherwise the country ran the risk that
immediately it lifted the embargo and returned to gold, it would
lose all its specie, either through massive exports or hoarding.
The United States was a case in point. It was the only major
economic power which still permitted the free import and export
of gold, and its gold reserves were under constant pressure
because of the high premium on sovereigns. How much more then the
reserves of a small economy's like South Africa's with a much
71 Strakosch, 'South African Currency', p. 12
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weaker currency?
For South Africa, in the world conditions as they
exist to-day, to venture upon a course which would
compel it to share alone with the United States of
America the burden of supplying the insatiable demand
for gold the world over is clearly an experiment of a
most hazardous kind.74
The country's problems would not end here. For if South Africa
did appreciate its currency to par, and sterling still remained
below par, British creditors, finding that their loans to the
Union were suddenly worth much more, would call in these loans,
convert them into their own currency and export the profits.
Thus, in no time at all the country would not only find itself
denuded of all of its gold reserves, but also drained of most of
its British capital.75
Strakosch therefore not only called for the retention of the
embargo, but insisted that on its own this was not enough. ' [So]
long as a sovereign is exchangeable for more than 20s in Union
currency', he argued, ' so long will it disappear from
circulation'. Thus, he held,
Action of a much more positive and comprehensive kind
than the mere prohibition of export of coin is ...
needed to put the currency of the country and its
credit structure on a safe footing.76
The 'more positive and comprehensive' action envisaged by him was
the withdrawal of all gold coin from circulation and its
replacement with specially created 'Treasury Gold Certificates'.
'The effect of such a scheme', he explained, 'is to
make the Government, so to say, the guardian of the
country's gold currency during a time in which its
free circulation is endangered by the extraordinary
world conditions' ,77
The impact of Strakosch's pamphlet on Smuts's government was
indeed profound; and shortly after his arrival in the country he
helped to draft three Bills in collaboration with the Treasury,
which were based almost entirely on his recommendations:
(1) To conserve the Specie Supplies of the Union by
providing for the issue of Gold Certificates;
(2) To provide for the establishment of a Central
Reserve Bank for the Union; and
74
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(3) To consolidate and amend the laws in force
relating to Banks.78
It is not clear to what extent Smuts actually agreed with
Strakosch's economic analysis. But he had little difficulty
appreciating the political implication of Strakosch's proposals.
This was basically that in maintaining its currency and financial
ties with Great Britain, the Union would remain an integral and
vital part of the British Empire. Smuts, with his heightened
sense of the virtues of imperial unity, and genuine belief that
South Africa's interests and future lay in the strengthening and
not dismembering of the Empire, could thus readily identify with
this aspect of Strakosch's advice.79
Marching together with sterling
Strakosch might have won Smuts over to his side, but he still had
to overcome the Union's Parliament before his proposals could be
translated into official government policy. In March 1920 it
appointed an all-party Select Committee to enquire and report
upon:
(a) the effect of the embargo on the export of specie
upon the cost of living; and
(b) the desirability and practicability or otherwise,
with a view to improving the economic conditions of
the Union, of removing the embargo and of modifying
the statutory provisions at present in force in regard
to currency and banking.80
Edwin Cannan, who like Evans was also a champion of the currency
school, no doubt exaggerated for polemical purposes when he
claimed that this Select Committee was 'like clay in the hands
of .... Strakosch' .81 But he was not far from the truth. Not
only was Strakosch the Committee's only witness for the first
nine days, but he also attended all its meetings until his
departure for England on 4 June 1920. He was allowed to read as
evidence before the Committee his pamphlet on South Africa's
currency and exchange situation, and was the only witness
afforded the opportunity of listening to and replying to the
evidence of the other witnesses.
During his questioning Strakosch again made great play of
the disastrous consequences that would follow if South Africa
prematurely lifted the embargo and returned to a fully-fledged
gold standard. Some of his graver warnings went as follows:
78 De Kock, History of, p. 14.
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The removal of the gold embargo would impede
production, and it would foster importation, reduce
our exports, and would lead to a withdrawal of capital
from this country.
And,
If you allowed the free export of gold, I have no
doubt that every sovereign will disappear. The country
would be completely denuded of currency.
And again.
If we have a rapid return to gold parity it will bring
disaster; it will result in severe crisis; it will
lead to a complete breakdown of credit and all our
activities; our industries and trade will be
enormously restricted; and thousands will be thrown
out of employment.82
But it would be quite wrong to portray Strakosch's intervention
as simply a negative one. For he skilfully combined his
prophecies of doom with promises of prosperity and stability were
his proposals to be implemented.
A potentially highly divisive issue at the time was the
great difficulty that the wool farmers - the country's biggest
exporters after the gold producers - were experiencing in getting
the banks to finance their export business. This had enormous
political implications as the wool farmers carried considerable
electoral weight. Deflecting the criticism away from the banks,
Strakosch argued that if the drainage of the banks' gold reserves
were stopped - which his gold certificate scheme provided for -
there would no longer be a reason for them to restrict their
credit facilities as the funds that would otherwise have been
necessary to replenish their gold stocks would now be available
to promote not only agriculture, but also local manufacture.
However, the first step, he insisted, was to 'secure the banks
from the withdrawal of their reserves',83
The report which the Select Committee eventually laid before
the House of Assembly could have been written by Strakosch
himself, so closely did it follow his line of argument. It
repeated with little qualification his assertion that the
movement of the exchanges was governed by the law of supply and
demand, and not, as the Gold Conference had suggested, by
currency inflation. It therefore followed that until South
Africa's trade position improved, the government had no choice
but to retain the restrictions on the free movement of gold. In
the Select Committee's words:
The Banks and other witnesses impressed upon your
Committee the imminent danger, if the embargo were
82
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removed, of the Union being completely denuded of its
specie reserves and your Committee is so impressed
with the reality of this danger that it is not
prepared to face the responsibility of recommending
the removal of the embargo, especially in view of the
inadequacy of the reserves at present.84
Furthermore, accepting Strakosch's argument for a temporary
inconvertible currency, the Committee gave its complete backing
to his gold certificate scheme.8*
In effect, the Select Committee was endorsing the bills
which Strakosch had drafted in collaboration with the Union's
Treasury. These were later consolidated into one bill, and formed
the basis of what in August 1920 passed into legislation as the
Currency and Banking Act (Act No. 31 of 1920) . That Strakosch had
succeeded in achieving the immediate objectives of the interest
groups he represented is clear from the provisions of the Act.
For the Act, inter alia, retained the embargo on the export of
gold, made bank notes legal tender and non-convertible, and
provided for the issue of inconvertible gold certificates.
For the mining companies - especially the poorer grade mines
- the premium on the sterling price for gold had become a vital
life-line. To be sure, the long-term interests of the gold
producers lay in the restoration of the gold standard, as this
would guarantee that there would always be a market for their
product. But while the premium lasted, they preferred that the
South African pound did not appreciate against sterling.
Retaining the embargo and introducing an inconvertible
currency also suited the banks. This was in fact what they had
been demanding ever since specie began to disappear from the
country, but were unable to accomplish on their own because of
public hostility towards them and suspicion as to their real
motives.
But the real beneficiaries were the Bank of England and the
City of London. For by delaying South Africa's return to gold
until Great Britain was in a stronger position to restore
sterling to mint parity, the threat of a break-up of the imperial
exchange system was minimised. Strakosch had clearly rendered a
valuable service to the interest groups he represented.86
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Straining at the leash
In later years some of South Africa's economists would turn back
to the early 1920s as an example of when the country, as the main
gold-producing Dominion, was in the unique position to lead not
only the British Empire, but also the rest of the world back on
to the international gold standard. According to Arndt, however,
' in the typical "alles sal reg kom" fashion, it let England
assume the actual leadership', and thus squandered a great
opportunity.87
Whether or not South Africa would have been able to assume
such leadership is a moot point. However, it is misrepresenting
the case to portray the Union as simply having being led by the
nose. Strakosch's principal aim was to convince the South African
authorities that the country's interests would be best served by
timing the return to gold to coincide with that of Britain's. To
this end, he was firmly opposed to any time-limits being placed
on the maintenance of the embargo or his scheme for an
inconvertible currency.
'It is impossible for any human being to say when the
trade of the world will be in a state of balance', he
insisted in his evidence before the 1920 Select
Committee, 'and that is why I say no man can foretell
at what time we shall be in a position to revert to
the gold standard'.88
However, the political opposition to South Africa leaving the
gold standard was so strong, that Smuts's government was only
able to get the Currency and Banking Bill through the committee
stage of parliament by agreeing to fix definite dates when both
the embargo and the provisions for an inconvertible currency
would lapse. Acknowledging as much in a speech to the House of
Assembly in June 1920, Henry Burton, the Minister of Finance,
said that while his government did not approve of fixing time-
limits, 'it was a concession which he [had to] make to meet the
wishes of parliament, reluctantly and very much against his
better judgement' .89
Indeed, while Britain's restrictions on the free export of
gold were not due to expire until 31 December 1931 - and
therefore by implication, Britain's return to gold90 - South
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Africa set as its date for the inconvertibility of the gold
certificates to lapse the 30 June 1923. The Union government
further agreed to carry out the Gold Conference's recommendation
and lift the embargo immediately the mint came into operation.
Thus, the question of whether South Africa's restoration of its
gold currency after 30 June 1923 would still depend on when
Britain decided to return to gold, or whether South Africa would
go ahead and re-establish its gold standard after this date
regardless of what happened in Britain, was still far from having
being settled with the passing of the Currency and Banking
Act.91
It is true that a later Currency Conference was to extend
the period of inconvertibility to 30 June 1925.92 But again this
was not without qualifications. It was stressed that the
prolongation of the inconvertibility of paper money was
contingent upon inflation being kept under control, and that
should the market price of gold in the Union at any
time within that period [30 June 1923 - 30 June 1925]
fall to Three pounds seventeen shillings and tenpence
halfpenny, or less, per standard ounce [that is,
should sterling sharply depreciate], and so continue
for a period of thirty days, the power of the
Governor-General to suspend the redemption of Gold
Certificates shall automatically lapse.93
In other words, South Africa's preparedness to continue to follow
1972), p. 23
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Britain's lead in returning to gold was made strictly dependent
upon the British government honouring its commitment to do
everything in its power to restore sterling to mint parity.94
Also, while the Currency Conference did postpone the return
to gold, it was not able to achieve the same result with regard
to the embargo. The Pretoria Mint was by now close to completion,
and the Conference therefore felt obliged to set as a definite
date for the lifting of all restrictions on the export of gold
the 1 July 1922.95 This was an ironic twist to the situation
that had existed immediately after the war. Then notes were
convertible, but gold coin could not be exported. Now notes were
inconvertible, but the export of gold coin would be permitted.
On one level this could no doubt be interpreted as a sop to
Nationalist and Labour supporters, but on another, it was an
important symbolic victory.96
The South African pound comes of age
The case for South Africa to break with sterling and restore its
currency on a gold basis had always been fuelled by a strong
nationalist sentiment. Underlying it was the assumption that the
country could only be said to be truly independent once it had
control over its own monetary policy. Only then, it was held,
would it be in a position to pursue an economic policy that was
in its own interests and not subordinate to imperial
considerations. Consequently, opposition to maintaining the link
with sterling also included the call to terminate the
preferential selling arrangement the Bank of England had made
with South Africa's gold producers; demands for a local refinery
and mint; and agitation for a State Bank that would provide the
necessary funds for the development of local industry and
agriculture.
The question, therefore, of whether or not the contrary view
was to prevail - that the nature of the economic links between
the two countries made it more desirable for South Africa 'to
march as far as possible in step with Great Britain on the road
towards an effective gold standard',97 did not depend entirely
on the strengths of its economic analysis. It also needed a
government in South Africa sympathetic to preserving the British
connection; which is what the British authorities by and large
found in Smuts's Dominion-oriented government.
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With the accession to power of the Pact government in June
1924, however, the balance of forces began to shift against the
kind of monetary relationship which imperial Britain favoured.
Yet, even though they were to make common cause on the currency
question, the Nationalist and Labour parties came to the
rejection of the Union's currency arrangements with Britain from
different angles. For the Nationalists, it was the political
considerations which loomed largest. Freeing the Union's currency
from the dominance of the imperial exchange system was for them
the complement to achieving greater political autonomy within the
British Empire.
Labour, on the other hand, was more predisposed to remaining
part of the Empire. In fact, as a condition of the alliance, the
Nationalists agreed that 'if returned to power they would not,
during the life of the next Parliament, use their vote to upset
the existing constitutional relationship of South Africa with the
British crown' ,98 But as Labour saw it, money wages that were
not directly convertible into gold could easily lead to the
working person being swindled. For unlike the gold content of the
sovereign - which was a fixed value - an inconvertible paper
currency could be fiddled with, especially if it suited the
purposes of the employing classes.
Thus, one of the first important acts of the Pact government
after taking office - in keeping with its election promises - was
to appoint a commission to advise on the Union's breaking with
sterling and re-establishing its gold currency. To the Bank of
England's dismay, which in the past had always been consulted
when crucial questions such as these arose, Hertzog's government
chose to call upon advisors not connected in any way to Britain's
financial institutions. Thus, E.W. Kemmerer, Professor of
Economics and Finance at Princeton University, United States, and
G. Vissering, President of De Nederlandsche Bank, Amsterdam, were
invited
to visit the Union and to investigate the question of
the restoration of the gold standard by the Union
independent of the United Kingdom."
There was of course a perfect logic to Hertzog's actions, which
even Norman, the Bank's Governor, was forced to recognise after
he had overcome his initial shock.
'The Hertzogites when in opposition', he wrote to
Clegg, Governor of the Reserve Bank, 'made no end of
promises about a State Bank and gold and all the rest
of it .... It is quite clear that the advisers of the
last Government can, under no circumstances, give them
help. On the other hand, an eminent Dutchman and a
cranky American might give precisely the same advice
as was given to the last Government in such a way that
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the present Government could decently eat its words
and follow the advice'.100
Political reasons certainly played a big part in whom Hertzog
chose as advisors. With Kemmerer this was perhaps less the case.
By the time he visited South Africa, he had already established
an international reputation as a leading financial advisor, which
was later to earn him the title "money doctor". But what was very
significant about this choice was that Kemmerer was a known
advocate of the policy of monetary stabilisation via the gold
standard.101
Vissering's appointment, however, left no room for
ambiguity. As the President of the Bank of Netherlands, he
appealed directly to the Dutch-heritage and sensibilities of the
Afrikaners. Not surprising then that Strakosch decried the
Vissering-Kemmerer Commission as little more than 'the desire of
the Government to curry favour with the extreme supporters in the
Nationalist party ..',102
So concerned in fact was Hertzog's government to be seen as
untainted by imperial considerations, that it decided to exclude
Clegg - who before becoming Governor of the Reserve Bank had been
the Bank of England's Chief Accountant - from direct involvement
in the Commission's proceedings. As Clegg accounted to Norman,
Mr Havenga [Minister of Finance], told me that he,
personally, was in favour of associating me with the
Commission, but he was overruled by the rest of the
Cabinet, which thought that even I might be considered
by a section of the public as having an interest in
the question being settled one way or the other.103
Kemmerer and Vissering were unanimous that South Africa should
restore its currency on a gold basis immediately the gold
certificate scheme lapsed, and not first wait and see what
happened in Britain. While certainly not blind to the risks
involved in a complete break with sterling, they believed that
conditions in the country were never more favourable for a return
to gold. The currency was already close to mint parity - where
it had been for the past two months - which meant that hardly any
sacrifices would be necessary to return formally to gold. In
addition, the country was in a very 'strong gold position', with
the Reserve Bank carrying a gold reserve of over £10 million -
representing 64 per cent of its notes and deposits - and the main
commercial banks holding substantial sterling balances in
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London.104
Moreover, South Africa possessed the infrastructure
necessary not only to restore its gold currency, but also to keep
it at mint parity. It had its own refinery and mint, which could
provide all the specie required for the country's internal needs
and for export. And even more importantly, it now boasted a
central reserve bank - with the exception of the Bank of England,
the only central bank in the Commonwealth - which would be able
to exercise a moderating influence on the money market and check
any dangerous inflationary tendencies.105
Kemmerer and Vissering had hardly submitted their report,
when Hertzog's government announced its intention to implement
it in full.106 Having grown accustomed to important decisions of
this kind first going through a long process of debate and
discussion, The Star - which favoured a simultaneous return to
gold with sterling - bemoaned what it saw as indecent haste on
the part of Hertzog's government:
It might have been expected that the Government would
have delayed coming to a decision till the report had
been published, and that even with the report before
them they would have consulted a conference of
representatives of the various interests involved,
such as met when the Act of 1920 was introduced and
again in 1923 when the question had to be considered
of renewing the section under which the gold
certificates were made inconvertible. This, however,
has not been done.107
But The Star clearly did not grasp the issues that were at stake.
For the secession-minded Nationalists, endorsing the
recommendations of the Vissering-Kemmerer Commission was
something more than a question of monetary reform. Indeed, at the
heart of their decision - embracing and transcending the gold
question - was their struggle to achieve political independence
from Britain. Given the existing currency and monetary relations
between the two countries, it was unavoidable that this struggle
would be waged in terms which implied a financial break with
London.
Summary
The extent of imperial capital's dominance over South Africa's
104
 U.G.13-'25, pp. xv-xvi.
105
 ibid., pp. xxvii-xxviii.
106
 BEA, OV37/21, Reserve Bank to Bank of England, 13 January
1925.
107
 The Star, 20 January 1925.
30
economy at the time of the formation of Union inevitably raises
serious questions about the content of the country's political
independence in 1910. Put another way, can a country be said to
be truly independent and sovereign while it does not exercise any
real control over its economic policy? This is not to deny that
the making of Union was of far-reaching political significance.
Yet, it is also evident that the unified state which emerged in
1910, far from representing the triumph of national interests
over imperial interests, did much to safeguard British supremacy
in South Africa. This extremely complex and contradictory
situation has been recognised and commented upon by various
historians. What this paper suggests is that our understanding
of Britain's continued domination over South Africa - even after
the country had formally gained its political independence - and
the challenge which took place to imperial capital's hegemony
during the period 1914-1925, can be enhanced by looking at the
way in which South Africa was incorporated into the imperial
economic system - particularly with regard to such crucial and
sensitive matters as currency and banking.
* I am grateful to Belinda Bozzoli for commenting on an
earlier draft of this paper.
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